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DICKINSON LAW REVIEW
thereof". This would seem to be broad enough to cover
any possible interpretation the courts may ultimately place
upon the new section 1212.
R. L. MYERS, JR.
REAL PROPERTY-NUISANCES-BUILDING RE-
STRICTIONS-GARAGES. Three recent cases by the
same parties' disclose an interesting litigation on the sub-
ject of the erection of garages as nuisances or as violations
of building restrictions. The first Ladner v. Siegel case2 has
definitely established the rule that a public garage in an
exclusively residential neighborhood constitutes a nuisance
per se. The defendants planned to construct a garage with
space for the handling of over 400 automobiles in a neigh-
borhood in West Philadelphia that was exclusively resi-
dential. Notice was given to the defendants that an in-
junction would be sought to prevent its erection. Never-
theless the building was started and a preliminary injunc-
tion was granted against the use of any building on the
premises as a public garage. The building was completed
and the lower court made the injunction permanent.
On appeal to the Supreme Court it was said that a
nuisance per se was any such business as is "generally
known to be injurious to health and to cause legal damage
to pronerty in certain localities and surroundings, regard-
less of how it may be carried on, for the common ex-
perience of mankind, of which the courts will take judicial
notice, proves this to be the result, and such pursuits in cer-
tain areas are to be prohibited."3 The court held that a
public garage when conducted in a residential district is
such a business and a nuisance per se.'
The importance of holding a given pursuit a nuisance
per se is the resulting ease in the matter of proof. If a
pursuit has been held such a nuisance all that need be
averred and proved is the character of the neighborhood
and the actual or proposed conduct of the given business
and an injunction will be granted. If not a nuisance per se,
these averments must be followed by an averment and
'Ladner v. Siegel, 293 Pa. 306; 294 Pa. 360; 294 Pa. 368 (1928).
2293 Pa. 306 (1928).
sPa. Co. v. Sun Oil Co., 290 Pa. 404, 410 (1927).
4Mitchell v. Guaranty Corp., 283 Pa. 361 (1925); Unger v. Edge-
wood Garage, 287 Pa. 14 (1926).
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proof of injurious consequences flowing from the business
in question.5 This latter is frequently attended with no
little difficulty,
In several previous cases it had been shown that public
garages were nuisances in fact due to the injurious con-
sequences flowing from their operation and their use as
such had been restrained.' Other cases had held that public
garages were nuisances in residential neighborhoods and
apparently had based their holdings on the conclusion that
such were nuisances per se.1 Since Ladner v. Siegel" there
can be no doubt that such is the law.
Hohl v. Modell9 and George v. Goodo7itch'0 were cases
where a number of joined individual garages, owned by one
person but rented to various car owners, were found to be
nuisances in fact in residential neighborhoods and their op-
eration enjoined. The court in the first-mentioned case
called such garages semi-public garages.
A sales and service station was held to be practically a
public garage and a nuisance in fact in Slinguff v. Tyson.1'
A service station has been declared to be a nuisance per se.
12
In Carney v. Penn Oil Co.13 a filling station where no
accessories were sold or cars repaired was held not to be a
nuisance per se but where operated in a residential neigh-
borhood and shown to produce injurious consequences to
adjacent property owners, as was shown in the instant case,
will be enjoined. It is to be noted that the station was built
within a very few feet of the adjoining residence.
Apparently there has been but one case holding that a
purely private garage may be enjoined when shown to be
a nuisance in fact."
5Supra, note 3.
6Prendergast v. Walls, 257 Pa. 547 (1917); Hohl v. Modell, 264
Pa. 516 (1919); Phillips v. Donaldson, 269 Pa. 244 (1920); Phillips
v. Dunseith, 269 Pa. 251 (1920); Tyson v. Coder, 83 Pa. Super. Ct. 116
(1924).
7Hunter v. Wood, 277 Pa. 150 (1923) ; Mitchell v. Guaranty Corp.,
supra; Unger v. Edgewood Garage, supra.
sSupra, note 2.
9Supra, note 6.
1o288 Pa. 48 (1927).
11280 Pa. 206 (1924).
'
2Mitchell v. Guaranty Corp., supra.
13291 Pa. 371 (1928). But see Braun v. Refining Co., 27 Dist.
Rpts. 451 (1917).
"4La Rossa v. Forte, 92 Pa. Super. Ct. 450 (1928).
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Frequently public garages have been held to constitute
violations of building restrictions, imposed upon property
in residential neighborhoods, against offensive or obnoxious
trades or businesses. 15 The operation of a filling station
will be permitted where the building restriction permits a
"store" on the premises.16
The second of the Ladner v. Siegel cases" was decided
on the question whether the operation of the garage would
constitute a violation of a building restriction that there
should be but private dwellings and garages erected on the
property and that it should not be used for commercial pur-
poses. The court found that the garage was erected on
land that had originally been retained by the common
grantor and that it was not subject to the building re-
striction.
The third of these cases' was an application under the
Act of June 18, 1923, P. L. 840 for a declaratory judgment
defining the use that might be made of the garage without
violating the injunction that had been granted or without
having the operation enjoined as a nuisance in fact although
being used as a private garage merely. A declaratory judg-
ment was entered by the lower court. The Supreme Court
held that the case was a moot one merely, that it really
sought an advisory opinion and that such could not properly
be granted under the Act. Nor may a decree of the court
be construed under the guise of a declaratory judgment.
The judgment was accordingly reversed.
In other jurisdictions the cases are almost unanimous
in holding that garages and filling stations are not nui-
sances per se but must be shown to be nuisances in fact
by reason of injuries flowing from their operation. 19
15Hibberd v. Edwards, 235 Pa. 454 (1912); Hohl v. Modell, supra;
Phillips v. Donaldson, supra; Hunter v. Wood, supra.
16Gunther v. Atlantic Refining Co., 277 Pa. 289 (1923).
17294 Pa. 360 (1928).
18294 Pa. 368 (1928).
190'Hara v. Nelson, 63 AtI. 836 (N. J. 1906); Diocese of Trenton
v. Toman, 70 Atl. 606 (N. J. 1908); Sherman v. Livingston, 128 N. Y.
S. 581 (1910); Electra v. Cross, 225 S. W. 795 (Tex. 1920); Marshall
v. Dallas, 253 S. W. 887 (Tex. 1923); Julian v. Oil Co., 212 Pac. 884
(Kan. 1923); Brown v. Easterday, 194 N. W. 798 (Neb. 1923); Haines
v. Cadillac Co., 97 S. E. 162 (N. C. 1918).
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The cases are numerous in which garages have been
held to be violations of various building restrictions.20 A
few cases, however, disclose a liberal attitude in freeing
garages from the withering blight of restrictions placed on
premises before automobiles were as numerous as they are
today or before they were in existence.21
A recent case in Oklahoma decided that a municipal
ordinance forbidding a filling station within certain dist-
ances of churches and schools was a valid one, the court
taking judicial notice that such a station in a residential
neighborhood would constitute a nuisance. 22
In Blaustein v. Pincus2a leased premises were used as
a lodging house. The landlord leased the adjoining prem-
ises to a tenant to use as a garage. The subsequent use of
this land as a garage was held to constitute an eviction of
the adjoining tenant so as to relieve from liability for rent.
HAROLD S. IRWIN
UNCONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENTS-The bald
statement that this or that amendment to a constitution
is unconstitutional, is more or less startling to those who
have given serious thought to the construction and inter-
pretation of constitutions, and their functions in the bus-
iness of governing a people. Such statements are, however,
quite commonly made, seemingly without consciousness of
the apparent incongruity involved. In fact, the very fre-
quency with which they are encountered, both within and
without the ranks of the legal profession, provokes inquiry
as to possible foundations for the statement among the
recognized canons of constitutional interpretation.
The ordinary and accepted meaning of 'unconstitu-
tionality', as it is most frequently applied to statutes, is
2ORinggold v. Denhardt, 110 Atl. 321 (Md. 1920); Evans v. Foss,
80 N. E. 587 (Mass. 1907); Riverbank Co. v. Bancroft, 95 N. E. 216
(Mass. 1911); Williams v. Carr, 248 S. W. 625 (Mo. 1923); Hepburn
v. Long, 131 N. Y. S. 154 (1911); Perpall v. Gload, 190 N. Y. S. 417
(1921); Wilmot v. Gandy, 203 N. Y. S. 535 (1923).
21Beckwith v. Pirung, 119 N. Y. S. 444 (1909); Hammond v. Con-
stant, 168 N. Y. S. 384 (1917); Riverbank Co. v. Bancroft, 95 N. E.
216 (Mass. 1911); Ronan v. Barr, 89 Atl. 282 (N. J. 1913).
22Magnolia Petroleum Co. v. Wright, (Old. 1926).28131 Pac. 1064 (Mont. 1913).
